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Transparency and monetary affairs
christine kaufmann and rolf h. weber
A. Introduction
Transparency has for decades been a hotly debated topic in ﬁnancial
markets. In the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis the transparency debate
became a priority for politicians and regulators around the world. A
hundred years ago, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis expressed his
concern about the lack of transparency in ﬁnancial markets, mainly in view
of the necessity to protect investors better: ‘Publicity is justly commended as
a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efﬁcient policeman’.1
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, transparency means ‘easily
seen through, recognized, understood, or detected; manifest, evident,
obvious, clear’.2 Transparency in government is to be realised by dissem-
ination of information, both as a human right (in the form of freedom of
information) and by making information public through institutional chan-
nels.3 From an economic perspective, the availability of adequate information
is a prerequisite for efﬁcient free markets.4 Therefore, the transparency
principle encompasses the element of visibility and clarity on the one hand
and the element of empowerment and capability on the other, entailing the
process of ‘seeing through’ as well as the ‘object’ that is being looked at.5
1 L. D. Brandeis, ‘What Publicity Can Do’ in L. D. Brandeis (ed.), Other People’s Money:
And How the Bankers Use It (Mansﬁeld Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, 2009, ﬁrst
published 1914 by McClure Publications), p. 92.
2 Oxford English Dictionary, online edition, 2012, www.oed.com/view/Entry/204968?
redirectedFrom=transparency#eid.
3 R. H. Weber, Datenschutz v. Öffentlichkeitsprinzip, (Zurich: Schulthess, 2010), paras. 18
and 24.
4 G. A. Akerlof, ‘TheMarket for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (1970), 488.
5 See C. Kaufmann and R.H. Weber, ‘The Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation’,
Journal of International Economic Law 13:3 (2010), 779–97, 779–80 with further references.
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We developed a comprehensive, rule-based rather than purely
process-oriented approach by suggesting a three-dimensional concept
of transparency in ﬁnancial markets.6 This three-dimensional concept,
upon which we can build, is summarised as follows:
– The ﬁrst pillar is designed by institutional aspects, i.e., procedures and
decision-making; by providing legal certainty, transparency can serve
as an anchor for ﬁnancial regulation.
– The second pillar encompasses the substantive backbone of ﬁnancial
regulation addressing the values and goals of ﬁnancial market
policies.
– The third pillar looks at the accountability of actors as an essential
element for rebuilding conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial market system.
Transparency takes different shapes for different actors and different
segments in ﬁnancial markets. While transparency for commercial
transactions and private actors has received substantial attention in
legal discussions, legal research on the role of transparency in monetary
affairs is still in its infancy. For a long time, central banks, as the key
actors in monetary affairs, worked secretly, and ‘a change in bank rate
was no more regarded as the business of the Treasury than the color
which the Bank [of England] painted its front door’.7 Even in 1989, a
book on the Federal Reserve with the catchy title Secrets of the Temple
seemed to realistically reﬂect central banks’ policies.8 Clearly, these days
are over. Central banks are now supposed to be open about their
objectives, outlooks, policy strategies and even their mistakes.9 This is
particularly relevant for transactions that require conﬁdentiality in order
to be effective, such as market interventions with a view to inﬂuencing
exchange rates. However, such transactions are not completely exempt
from transparency requirements, yet they need to be communicated ex
post rather than in advance. Recent central bank regulations take these
considerations into account by, e.g., publishing the minutes of monetary
6 Ibid., 783 ff.
7 Otto Niemeyer, director of ﬁnancial inquiries at HM Treasury commenting on British
monetary policy in 1929, quoted in: D. E. Moggridge, British Monetary Policy, 1924–1931
(Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 160.
8 W. Greider, Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country (New York:
Touchstone, 1989).
9 N. Dincer and B. Eichengreen, ‘Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and
Updates’, Theoretical Inquiries in Law 11 (2010), 75–123, 76.
transparency and monetary affairs 463
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 130.60.248.196 on Thu Dec 11 14:08:16 GMT 2014.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107479920.023
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2014
authorities’ meetings with a certain time delay10 or requiring a central
bank’s governors to explain their past monetary policy decisions before
parliamentary commissions.11 Ex post transparency may therefore par-
tially compensate for the lack of government or parliament involvement
when urgent market interventions require conﬁdentiality.
This chapter applies the above mentioned three-dimensional concept
of transparency to monetary affairs as a key segment of ﬁnancial
markets.
B. Monetary affairs: mapping existing actors
and their activities
Transparency in general has been a priority on the agenda of govern-
ments for a long time. When President Obama announced his initiative
for open government in 2009,12 he was able to build on a commonly
accepted but not very speciﬁc principle of a democratic government
required to be transparent while leaving room for the protection of
essential state and security interests. This kind of balance, so far, has
not been applied to monetary affairs. In fact the question is twofold: to
what extent is transparency functionally possible and when does its
operation depend upon conﬁdentiality vis-à-vis governments and ﬁnan-
cial markets?
Since monetary affairs are neither a homogeneous ﬁeld nor are they
conducted by a single actor, a brief mapping of existing actors and
their activities in this area is necessary. Apart from governments,
monetary authorities, i.e., central banks and currency boards, are the
key actors.13
10 E.g. for the US Federal Reserve, see Sec. 10.10 of the Federal Reserve Act (12 USC 226)
and the Government in the Sunshine Act (5 USC section 552b) and the Federal Reserve
Board’s Rules Regarding Public Observation of Meetings (12 CFR part 261b). The
Governing Board of the ECB is currently (2013) considering to publish the minutes of
its meeting: joint interview with Benoît Cure´ and Jörg Asmussen, Members of the
Executive Board of the ECB, conducted by Andrea Rexer and Jean-Pierre Robin on 23
July 2013 and published on 29 July 2013 in Süddeutsche Zeitung and Le Figaro (www.ecb.
europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130729.en.html).
11 Article 7 para. 2 Federal Act of the Swiss National Bank (SR 951.11).
12 Transparency and Open Government, Presidential Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 FR 4685, 21 January 2009.
13 C. E. Walsh, Monetary Theory and Policy, 3rd edn (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press, 2010), pp. 135–43.
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I. Governments
Many governments issued ‘sunshine laws’14 with Sweden taking the lead
as early as 1766,15 followed, inter alia, by the US with the Freedom of
Information Act of 1966.16 The starting point for government trans-
parency is the normative concept of a right to know as a key prerequisite
for democracy and participation. This general concept has only recently
been further reﬁned to support speciﬁc public policies such as the
protection of the environment,17 or ﬁscal and budget policy.18 Thus,
the normative concept is increasingly being complemented by substan-
tive criteria on how speciﬁc policy goals can be enhanced by transpar-
ency.19 The way in which transparency mechanisms are structured
shapes their impact on public policy – on effectiveness on equity and
on democratic accountability.20
Clearly, governmental activities have an impact on monetary affairs.
Of particular relevance are ﬁscal and monetary policy measures. Often,
the administration will take the lead in ﬁscal policy with a monetary
authority – a central bank or a currency board21 – being the main
responsible institution for the monetary policy. Ideally, ﬁscal policy
and monetary policy are complementary. However, a ﬁscal policy
which does not factor in existing budget constraints may destabilise
long-term inﬂation expectations and thus lead to increased macroeco-
nomic instability.22 Transparency can play an important role in
14 Thus taking up Justice Brandeis’ metaphor, Brandeis, ‘What Publicity Can Do’. See for
example the Swiss Freedom of Information Act of 2004 (SR 152.3).
15 His Majesty’s Gracious Ordinance Relating to Freedom of Writing and of the Press, 2
December 1766, English version in: J. Mustonen (ed.), The World’s First Freedom of
Information Act – Anders Chydenius’ Legacy Today (Kokkola: Anders Chydenius
Foundation 2006), pp. 8–17. The current version is the Public Access to Information
of 2009, as amended in 2013 (Offentlighets- och sekretessförordning, 2009:641).
16 The Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC § 552, as amended by Public Law No. 104–231,
110 Stat. 3048.
17 The most prominent example is the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
participation inDecision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters of 25 June
1998 (UN Treaty Series vol. 2161, 447); A. P. J. Mol, ‘The Future of Transparency: Power,
Pitfalls and Promises’, Global Environmental Politics 10:3 (2010), 132–43.
18 D. Heald, ‘Why is Transparency about Public Expenditure so Elusive?’, International
Review of Administrative Sciences 78:1 (2012), 30–49.
19 Mol, ‘The Future of Transparency’, 132.
20 Heald, ‘Why is Transparency about Public Expenditure so Elusive?’, 32.
21 Discussed in Section B.II.2.
22 S. Kirchner, ‘Reforming Fiscal Responsibility Legislation’, Economic Papers 30:1 (2011),
29–32, 29; P. de Renzo and H. Masud, ‘Measuring and Promoting Budget Transparency:
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reconciling different policies and fostering predictability and legal cer-
tainty. In addition, in the light of increasing international connectedness,
transparency is seen as a prerequisite for a modern concept of ﬁscal
sovereignty in a globalised environment.23
These normative elements are fairly straightforward. What needs to
be further developed in a monetary context, however, are speciﬁc trans-
parency mechanisms to foster policy coherence as well as ﬁscal sover-
eignty. In order to partially ﬁll this gap, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) developed speciﬁc standards for ﬁscal transparency, as discussed
in Section C.
II. Monetary institutions
One of the major challenges in designing monetary institutions is the
uncertainty about future social decisions. This uncertainty is due to both
the impossibility and the undesirability of committing future monetary
policy-makers to a previously deﬁned strategy. An ideal framework
would implement what is currently believed to be the optimal strategy
and only deviate from it if there is a collective change of view on this
strategy.24AsMervyn King put it so aptly, ‘our ignorance is too pervasive
to allow the adoption of a rule of how learning should occur.’25
1. Central banks
From an institutional perspective, with a few exceptions, central banks
are rather ‘youthful’.26 It is therefore not surprising that the debate on
central bank governance, including transparency, is relatively recent.
Accordingly, new studies show a clear trend towards greater central
bank transparency.27 Yet, a caveat applies: most of these studies are
based on a selective set of indicators for transparency, such as the
publication of inﬂation targets.28 Apart from this lack of conceptual
rigour, the economic context in which a central bank operates, whether
it is situated in an emerging or a developed country, is not always taken
The Open Budget Index as a Research and Advocacy Tool’, Governance: An International
Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 24:3 (2011), 607–16, 608.
23 P. Dietsch, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty in International Fiscal Policy’, Review of
International Studies 37 (2011), 2107–20, 2117–18.
24 M. King, ‘The Institutions of Monetary Policy’, Richard T. Ely Lecture, American
Economic Association Proceedings 94:2 (2004), 1–13, 1 and 5.
25 Ibid., 5. 26 Ibid., 2.
27 Dincer and Eichengreen, ‘Central Bank Transparency’, 91.
28 For a critical and more comprehensive approach, ibid., 88–9.
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into account. This empirical ﬁnding has been interpreted in various
ways. One view is that transparency enhances the effectiveness of mon-
etary policy because it allows for better communication and clearer
expectations among market participants. Central bank transparency
thus relates to three aspects: its price stability commitment, policy
intentions and effective communication of its economic assessment.29
Managing expectations, especially concerning inﬂation, is an essential
element in order for monetary policy to affect outcomes.30 Based on this
rationale, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank
announced its committment to give forward guidance to market partic-
ipants by communicating its speciﬁc expectations on market
developments.31
Another view relates central bank transparency to democratic
accountability. Transparency is therefore seen as a mechanism to bal-
ance central bank independence.32 From an economic perspective,
transparency ensures accountability of policy-makers in an environment
where the traditional instruments of ﬁxed or pegged exchange rates and
close central bank supervision by the government are replaced by ﬂexible
exchange rates and independence of central banks.33
The democratic rationale for implementing transparency and
accountability measures played a major role when European central
banks became independent in the context of the Treaty of Maastricht
in 1992, and the establishment of the European Monetary Union. While
the design of the new European Central Bank, to a large extent, followed
the model of the independent German Bundesbank, other central banks
such as the Bank de France were still under close supervision of the
government at the time. Studies on data from the 1980s suggested that
independence of the central bank was one of the key elements for success
in maintaining price stability.34 Prime examples at the time were the
29 M.K. Tang and X. Yu, ‘Communication of Central Bank Thinking and Inﬂation
Dynamics’, IMF Working Paper WP/11/209 (2011), pp. 6–7.
30 M. Ehrmann, S. Eijfﬁnger and M. Fratzscher, ‘The Role of Central Bank Transparency
for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts’, European Central Bank, Working Paper Series
No. 1146 (January 2010).
31 Press conference of the European Central Bank, Introductory statement by Mario
Draghi, President of the ECB, Frankfurt am Main, 4 July 2013.
32 Dincer and Eichengreen, ‘Central Bank Transparency’, 77.
33 S. C.W. Eijfﬁnger and P.M. Geraats, ‘How Transparent are Central Banks?’, European
Journal of Political Economy 22 (2006), 1–21.
34 A. Cukierman, S. Webb and B. Neyapti, ‘Measuring the Independence of Central Banks
and its Effect on Policy Outcomes’, The World Bank Economic Review 6 (1992), 353–98;
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German Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve. More recent studies con-
ﬁrmed that greater central bank independence is associated with lower
inﬂation.35 In addition, there is evidence that greater transparency is
associated with more use of public information and, in particular, central
banks’ forecasts. In such a context, the private sector will make greater
use of information provided by the central bank.36 If the public is better
informed about monetary policy, it can react more quickly to policy
decisions and thereby prevent public authorities from manipulating
inﬂation in pursuit of other interests.37
2. Currency boards
Unlike central banks, currency boards are bound by rules that generally
do not allow for discretionary monetary policy decisions. Typically, they
will apply a ﬁxed exchange rate with a reserve currency. As a result,
conﬂicts between exchange rate policies and monetary policies are
unlikely. Since currency boards are increasingly seen as an instrument
for overcoming central banks’ inherent lack of transparency, a brief
critical review seems appropriate.
Although currency boards performed well until the 1930s, they were
to a large extent replaced by central banks after World War II. In the
1990s, currency boards became relevant again. The reason for this
unexpected revival was the desire to install a monetary regime to
which the ﬁscal regime would be subordinate. In other words, currency
boards were seen as means to impose ﬁscal discipline.38
The most prominent current example of a currency board is the Hong
Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). Hong Kong applies a linked
exchange rate, with the Hong Kong dollar being linked to the US dollar
at an exchange rate of 7.8 Hong Kong dollars to one US dollar. Typically,
for a currency board system, the monetary base is fully backed by foreign
currency reserves at this ﬁxed exchange rate. The Basic Law for Hong
Kong explicitly requires that the issue of Hong Kong dollars is backed by
A. Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence – Theory and
Evidence (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992); for an update A. Cukierman,
‘Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions – Past, Present
and Future’, European Journal of Political Economy 24 (2008), 722–36.
35 C. Crowe and E. E. Meade, ‘Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution
and Effectiveness’, European Journal of Political Economy 24 (2008), 763–77, 769–70.
36 Ibid., 771–2. 37 Dincer and Eichengreen, ‘Central Bank Transparency’, 88.
38 S. H. Hanke, ‘Currency Boards’, Annals, American Academy of Political and Social
Science 579 (2002), 87–105, 99.
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a 100 per cent reserve fund.39 However, the fact that the mandate of a
currency board and the objectives of monetary policy are built on legally
binding rules does not automatically provide transparency, as the devel-
opment of the Hong Kong Exchange Fund illustrates: established by
ordinance in 1935, the accounts of the Exchange Fund were kept con-
ﬁdential until 1992. Since then, transparency has been steadily
increased; since 1999 the Special Data Dissemination Standard
(SDDS) of the International Monetary Fund40 has been applied. In
2000 a new template for international and foreign currency liquidity
was implemented:
The public disclosure of such information on a timely and accurate
basis promotes informed decision making in the public and private
sectors, thereby helping to improve the functioning of global ﬁnancial
markets.41
Currently, the templates are published monthly. In addition, the record
of discussion of the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee (EFAC) Sub-
Committee on Currency Board Operations is disclosed to the public.
On its website, the HKMA identiﬁes ﬁve characteristics of a properly
run currency board: transparency, simplicity, reliability, predictability
and credibility.42 These characteristics are however not currency-board
speciﬁc but rather seem to reﬂect what is currently understood as
effective public policy-making. Similarly, HKMA’s published statement
on transparency remains rather general:
The HKMA seeks to follow international best practices in its transpar-
ency arrangements. The HKMA places great emphasis on promoting a
wide understanding of its policies and work. This is done through
extensive contacts with the media, a range of regular publications, a
comprehensive website, a public enquiries service and an educational
programme.43
39 Article 111 of the Basic Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: ‘The
Hong Kong dollar, as the legal tender in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
shall continue to circulate. The authority to issue Hong Kong currency shall be vested in
the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The issue of Hong
Kong currency must be backed by a 100 per cent reserve fund. The system regarding the
issue of Hong Kong currency and the reserve fund system shall be prescribed by law.’
40 Discussed in Section C.II.2.
41 www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/exchange-fund/transparency.shtml.
42 www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/classroom/page/work/work_02_01.htm.
43 www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/classroom/page/work/work_06_01.htm.
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In sum, the classic blueprint of a currency board44 which would
emphasise its transparency in contrast to traditional central banks’
secrecy cannot be applied to the new generation of currency boards
which was introduced in the 1990s. These days, currency boards are still
based on the rather mechanical principle of conversion and issuing fully
backed base money. Yet, guaranteeing convertibility throughout a
highly complex international ﬁnancial system has become challenging.
Due to the backing requirement, a currency board has limited possibil-
ities for providing additional liquidity in times of systemic con-
straints.45 As a result, stable monetary policy may come at the price
of increased systemic risks. For this reason, most modern currency
boards have applied speciﬁc policies in this regard and for example
also serve as lender of last resort.46 Not surprisingly, these policies
require a clear division of tasks between the different actors and there-
fore call for transparency.
C. Transparency and the ﬁnancial crisis
I. Lack of transparency as an underlying reason
for the ﬁnancial crisis
1. Financial markets
While the reasons for the recent ﬁnancial crisis are manifold, a lack of
transparency played a major role in undermining predictability of and
trust in the ﬁnancial markets and in the resulting volatility and insta-
bility. Intransparency may occur in three dimensions: product, gover-
nance and organisation related.
Newly developed structured ﬁnancial products such as collateralised
debt obligations (CDOS) were highly complex by nature and inherently
intransparent.47 Tools and instruments designed to hedge risks were
sometimes (mis)used for increased leverage and, in the words of
44 C. Ho, ‘A Survey of the Institutional and Operational Aspects of Modern-day Currency
Boards’, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Working Papers No 110 (March 2002),
pp. 3–5.
45 Ibid., p. 13.
46 Ibid., p. 15. Hanke, ‘Currency Boards’, seems to have overlooked this development,
at 100.
47 J. Crotty, ‘Structural Causes of theGlobal Financial Crisis: ACritical Assessment of the ‘New
Financial Architecture’’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 33 (2009) 563–80, at 566.
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Warren Buffet, became ‘a weapon of ﬁnancial mass destruction’.48
Moreover, many ﬁnancial innovations created links between formerly
unconnected players as illustrated, for instance, by the US subprime
crisis.49
New synthetic products and the related increase in interconnectivity
among ﬁnancial markets call for a governance reaction in the form of
effective risk management systems both within institutions and at the
government level. Hence, in many ﬁnancial institutions the real ﬁnancial
exposure was not detected due to the lack of an effective risk manage-
ment system. The abuse of economic models to build up derivative
positions in order to proﬁt from high returns, as long as the correlating
risks did not materialise, had not been anticipated and accordingly was
not reﬂected in the risk management systems available. A similar phe-
nomenon could be observed at the state level: supervisory authorities
and regulators failed to react and instead continued to rely on mathe-
matical rigour and numerical precision in risk management and asset
pricing tools. In particular, the Basel II Framework with its highly
sophisticated risk assessment model50 contributed to a certain informa-
tion overload, which instead of promoting transparency led to opacity,51
and eventually a control illusion.52
The ﬁnancial crisis showed that ﬁnancial groups and ﬁnancial con-
glomerates can threaten the stability of the ﬁnancial system. One of the
reasons why these risks had not been detected earlier was the mix of
regulated and unregulated entities (such as special purpose entities and
unregulated holding companies) across sectorial boundaries and the
related challenges for sector-speciﬁc supervisory oversight. A prime
example in this respect was American International Group Ltd (AIG),
the world’s largest insurance company. AIG’s problems stemmed from
twomain sources: its securities lending programme and its investment in
48 Cited in D. Colander, M. Goldberg, A. Haas, K. Juselius, A. Kirman, T. Lux and B. Sloth,
‘The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of the Economics Profession’, Critical
Review 21:2–3 (2009), 249–67, 254.
49 Ibid., 263.
50 Bank of International Settlements, Basel II: International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework – Comprehensive Version,
June 2006: www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm.
51 C.M. Bradley, ‘Transparency is the New Opacity: Constructing Financial Regulation
after the Crisis’, American University Business Law Review 1 (2011) 7–34, 32.
52 Colander et al., ‘The Financial Crisis’, 254.
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credit default swaps (CDSs).53Despite its systemic relevance, AIG was, at
the time, under the supervision not of the Federal Reserve Bank but of
the Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision (OTS). OTS was the consolidated super-
visor of AIG because it was considered a thrift holding company by
virtue of its ownership of the AIG Federal Savings Bank. Given AIG’s
involvement in both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial entities, consolidated
supervision was not possible and systemic risks remained unidentiﬁed
until autumn 2008 when AIG was on the verge of collapsing and was
eventually bailed out by the Federal Reserve. One of the key lessons
learnt from the ﬁnancial crisis was therefore that it was necessary to
strengthen consolidated supervision particularly for systemically relevant
institutions with cross-sectorial activities.54
Finally, another phenomenon which has so far not attracted much
attention is closely linked to the above-mentioned organisational and
governance-related risks. As just noted in the context of the AIG, actors
in ﬁnancial markets which are not licensed as banks or securities dealers
have become increasingly important. Such ‘shadow-banking’55 activities
may create opportunities but at the same time become a source of risks.
Since they are not covered by the traditional ﬁnancial governance mech-
anisms and may therefore lack adequate regulatory frameworks and
monitoring, problems may amount to systemic risks, especially when
such institutions are performing bank-like functions such as leverage
and when they are strongly connected with the banking system. It is
therefore necessary for monetary and supervisory authorities to ﬁrst
map existing actors and then to identify and assess potential risks.56
2. Intransparent ﬁnancial markets and monetary affairs
With risks in ﬁnancial markets accumulating into systemic risks, mon-
etary authorities and political bodies became involved in crisis manage-
ment. In addition to insufﬁcient information about the risk exposure of
individual ﬁnancial institutions, uncertainty about how monetary
53 United States Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO), Report to Congressional
Requesters: Review of Federal Reserve System Financial Assistance to American
International Group, Inc, GAO-11–616, (September 2011), p. 5.
54 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Joint Forum, Principles for the Supervision of
Financial Conglomerates (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, September 2012).
55 Deﬁned by the Financial Stability Board as ‘credit intermediation involving entities and
activities outside the regular banking system’, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring
Report 2012, 18 November 2012, p. 3.
56 Ibid., p. 6.
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authorities and political institutions intended to react exacerbated the
crisis. Clearly, poorly understood and unknown risks can barely be
addressed in monetary policy. Not surprisingly, transparency has
become a regularly debated topic during the last four years. The follow-
ing section outlines some of the relevant policy discussions.
II. Reactions in policy making
The most noteworthy efforts to improve transparency are mirrored in
the G-20 declarations and statements, but other organisations have also
addressed transparency issues.
1. G-20
While decision-making in the G-20 itself cannot be deﬁned as trans-
parent and the group is not inclusive with regard to its stakeholders,57
the ‘transparency discourse’ has appeared at different levels of intensity
at several of the seven G-20 summits held so far:
(i) Transparency was most prominently mentioned at the G-20
Summit in Washington (November 2008).58 The ﬁrst of the ﬁve
common principles for reform of ﬁnancial markets addressed the
strengthening of transparency and accountability. Transparency is
also mentioned in the third common principle on the promotion of
integrity in ﬁnancial markets as well as in the list of the tasks of
ministers and experts, requesting them to make efforts to
strengthen the resilience and transparency of credit derivatives
markets.
In the Action Plan for the implementation of the principles for
reform, the word ‘transparency’ is again mentioned three times,
among others in the section on prudential oversight.
57 R. H. Weber, ‘The Legitimacy of the G20 as a Global Financial Regulator’, Banking &
Finance Law Review 28 (2013) 389–407. C. Kaufmann, ‘International Law in Recession?
The Role of International Law when Crisis Hits: Food, Finance, and Climate Change’, in
U. Fastenrath, R. Geiger, D.-E. Khan, A. Paulus, S. von Schorlemer and C. Vedder (eds.),
From Bilateralism to Community Interest, Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (Oxford
University Press, 2011), pp. 1189–206, 1202–3. M. Giovanoli, ‘The International
Monetary and Financial Architecture: Some Institutional Aspects’, Chapter 3, this
volume.
58 See Declaration G-20 Leaders Summit, Washington 2008: www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/
2008declaration 1115.html.
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(ii) The G-20 Summit in London (April 2009)59 addressed transpar-
ency in the context of the strengthening of ﬁnancial supervision
and regulation, since transparency contributes to the restoration of
conﬁdence and the rebuilding of trust in the ﬁnancial system.
(iii) The Declaration of the G-20 of the Pittsburgh Summit (September
2009)60 mentions the word ‘transparency’ thirteen times in mani-
fold contexts. Without going into the details of the various regu-
latory topics, two aspects are noteworthy:
* The G-20 welcomes the expansion of the Global Forum on
Transparency and Exchange Information, including the partic-
ipation of developing countries, as well as the agreement to
deliver an effective programme of peer review.61
* The G-20 supports the voluntary participation in the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative, which calls for regular public
disclosure of certain payments.62
(iv) In the Declaration of the Toronto Summit (June 2010),63 the G-20
particularly addressed transparency in the context of ﬁnancial
sector reform including aspects of banks’ balance sheets. Again
the word ‘transparency’ is mentioned more than ten times. The
following Seoul Summit of November 2010 did not speciﬁcally look
into these issues.
(v) The Cannes Summit of the G-20 (November 2011)64 partly
changed the perspective of the political agenda; transparency in
this declaration is related to agricultural markets, energy markets
and trade relations.
(vi) The Declaration of the G-20 leaders of the Los Cabos Summit (June
2012)65 shows a two-sided picture: transparency was looked at from
the angle of ﬁnancial sector reform on the one hand and from the
perspective of markets for agricultural products and energy, among
others, on the other hand. Apart from general elements of
59 See Declaration G-20 Leaders Summit, London 2009: www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/
2009communique0402.html.
60 See Declaration G-20 Leaders Summit, Pittsburgh 2009: www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/
2009communique0925.html.
61 Ibid., No. 15. 62 Ibid., No. 42.
63 See Declaration G-20 Leaders Summit, Toronto 2010: www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/
to-communique.html.
64 See Declaration G-20 Leaders Summit, Cannes 2011: www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/
2011-cannes-communique-111104-en.html.
65 See Declaration G-20 Leaders Summit, Los Cabos (Mexico) 2010: www.g20.utoronto.ca/
2012/2012–0619-loscabos.html.
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transparency and accountability leading to greater credibility and
conﬁdence, as well as to improved surveillance (including the
strengthening of competition among credit rating agencies), trans-
parency of the exchange rate policy as a part of monetary law is
explicitly mentioned (related to the renminbi exchange rate regime).
2. International Monetary Fund
In relation to its monetary stability objectives, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), together with the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), published a ‘Code of Good Practices in
Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies (MFP Transparency
Code). As a general rule, theMFP Transparency Code calls on the central
bank of each country as the ‘institution responsible for conducting
monetary policy’.66 The MFP Transparency Code addresses the clarity
of roles, responsibilities and objectives (Part I), the open process for
monetary policy decisions (Part II), the public availability of information
on monetary policy (Part III), and the accountability and assurance
of integrity by the Central Bank (Part IV).67 Each section contains
additional rules and guidelines.68 Based on the MFP Transparency
Code, the IMF encourages the authorities of member states to participate
in a detailed assessment of transparency of monetary and ﬁnancial
policies, mainly in the context of their participation in the Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP); an FSAP evaluation entails detailed
principle-by-principle assessments which are condensed in the Reports
on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC).69
In relation to ﬁscal matters, the IMF developed a ‘Code of Good
Practices on Fiscal Transparency’,70 a ‘Manual on Fiscal Transparency’,
and a ‘Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency’. The Code is based on
four general pillars, namely clarity of roles and responsibilities (Part I),
open budget processes (Part II), public availability of information
(Part III), and assurances of integrity (Part IV). The implementation of
66 IMF, Code of Good Practices in Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies (July
1999), p. 18.
67 See also R. H. Weber, ‘Financial Stability – Structural Framework and Development
Issues’, International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 6 (2008), 1–19, 1 and 7.
68 For further details, see D.W. Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth, and the Role
of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 131.
69 R. H. Weber and D.W. Arner, ‘Toward a New Design for International Financial
Regulation’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 29 (2007), 391–
453, 417 ff.
70 IMF, Code of Good Practices on Financial Transparency of 1998, updated 2007.
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the Code should follow the ‘Manual’ and the ‘Guide’; the assessment of
compliance with the Code can also be done in the context of the
establishment of ROSC.
Another important aspect is the transparency of macroeconomic data
since its public availability and comparability is important in combating
ﬁnancial crises.71 As an instrument designed to provide guidance, the
IMF has published standards in relation to data dissemination and
compilation, such as the Special Data Dissemination Standard
(SDDS)72 and the General Data Dissemination System (GDDS).73
These two standards encourage member states to substantially improve
data quality, statistics and data disclosure.74
The problem with the transparency objective consists less in the
availability of adequate transparency guidelines than in the willingness
to publish the IMF’s conclusive reports. In the past, the IMF often did
not disclose its ﬁndings due to concerns that publishing the data could
jeopardise the interests of the country concerned.75 Over the last few
years, however, the situation has improved: according to the IMF, as of
September 2011, eighty-eight countries had completed an assessment of
transparency in either monetary policies, ﬁnancial policies, or both, in
the context of an FSAP; furthermore, ﬁfty-seven countries’ ROSCs have
been published on the IMF website.76
Other elements could impede transparency, namely the not always
acknowledged functional, operational and economic independence of
the central bank as well as the vague limitations of regulatory powers.77
3. World Bank Group
Starting in the 1990s, the World Bank sponsored the establishment of a
worldwide database containing regulatory provisions and practices
71 See Weber, ‘Financial Stability’, p. 8.
72 IMF, Special Data Dissemination Standard (March 1996).
73 IMF, General Data Dissemination System (December 1997).
74 For more details, see Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth, and the Role of Law,
pp. 132–3.
75 Weber, ‘Financial Stability’, p. 7 and Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth and
the Rule of Law, at p. 131.
76 IMF, Factsheet: Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies, www.imf.org/exter
nal/np/exr/facts/mtransp.htm. On this issue, see also N. Rendak, ‘Monitoring and
Surveillance of the International Monetary System – What Can Be Learnt from the
Trade Field?’, Chapter 9, this volume.
77 R.M. Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (Oxford University
Press, 2006), pp. 44–6.
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relevant to banking activities. The survey is very thorough and encom-
passes the banking regulations of more than 150 countries. Important
aspects are the accounting practice, the external auditing and the ﬁnan-
cial statement transparency as well as the external ratings and the
creditors’ monitoring. The details are expressed in the form of variables
that measure the extent of effectiveness or strength of a given entity in
the different practices and enable comparisons across the countries.78
TheWorld Bank Group has also emphasised its concerns about trans-
parency by publishing a set of decisions issued by the World Bank
Group’s Sanctions Board. The disclosed cases concern alleged fraud
and corruption and mark a step towards more openness and account-
ability in the ﬁeld of anti-corruption.79
Furthermore, the World Bank Group, in collaboration with the
International Finance Cooperation (IFC), published a guide called
‘Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent
World’.80 The Report benchmarks the regulations that enhance business
activities and those that constrain them, providing quantitative indica-
tors on business regulations; the general comments are illustrated with
case studies.
4. European Central Bank
In the past, central banks were notorious for being inscrutable, as
reﬂected in Alan Greenspan’s famous quip that ‘if you understood
what I just said, you must not have heard me correctly’. More recently,
the situation has changed and central banks are increasingly trying to
improve clarity in explaining their objectives and decisions to the
public.
The European Central Bank (ECB) periodically publishes its mone-
tary policy strategy and communicates its regular assessment of eco-
nomic developments in order to help the markets to understand the
systematic response patterns of monetary policy; such transparency
makes policy adjustments more predictable for the markets over the
medium term.81
78 R. H. Weber, Shaping Internet Governance: Regulatory Challenges (Zurich: Schulthess,
2009), p. 126.
79 See World Bank Press Release No. 2012/481/EXT of 30 May 2012.
80 See www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2012.
81 European Central Bank, Eurosystem, www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/transparency/html/index.
en.html.
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The improvement of transparency of the ECB also is a political theme:
the Directorate General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament,
Section on Economic and Monetary Affairs, prepared a document enti-
tled ‘Improving ECB’s Accountability and Transparency’, requesting
further-reaching transparency of the ECB in September 2009.82 The
objective of this initiative is to transform the present ‘Monetary
Dialogue’ with the ECB President into a ‘Monetary Hearing’. However,
such an approach requires a careful assessment with a view to central
bank independence. The debate has recently been taken up again by
members of the ECB’s Governing Council who are calling for the release
of the Council’s meeting records.83
5. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Financial
Stability Board
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) realised enhance-
ments, including with regard to transparency issues, to the Basel II
capital framework in the reform package Basel III which was formally
accepted in September 2010.84 The regulations and guidelines prepared
by the BCBS, however, concern the ﬁnancial markets in general, not
monetary affairs in particular.
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has put considerable emphasis
on transparency objectives and has taken steps to encourage improved
disclosures. In March 2011, the FSB presented a ‘Thematic Review on
Risk Disclosure Practices’ addressing general transparency standards
and disclosure requirements under Basel III; the practices are analysed
and initiatives that are needed to keep risk disclosures relevant and
useful in the future are discussed in detail.85 In March 2012, the FSB
organised a Round Table on Risk Disclosure, which provided the
possibility for a debate about the key themes of transparency; the
respective disclosure requirements mainly concern ﬁnancial regulation
related to market participants and touch less upon monetary affairs.86
82 See www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200909/20090923ATT61084/20
090923ATT61084EN.pdf.
83 See below note 124 and accompanying text.
84 Bank for International Settlements, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More
Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, revised version (June 2011).
85 FSB, Thematic Review on Risk Disclosure Practices, Peer Review Report (18 March 2011)
www.ﬁnancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110318.pdf.
86 FSB, Press Release, 20 March 2012, www.ﬁnancialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_120320.pdf.
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6. World Trade Organization
Transparency rules are well known in the World Trade Organization
(WTO), notably in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which
addresses ﬁnancial services, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).87 Article X GATS,
which is of speciﬁc relevance here, attempts to achieve two transparency
objectives: on the one hand, transparency is seen as a tool to prevent
unnecessary barriers to trade by letting market participants know in
advance what requirements would apply in international services
trade. In this respect, transparency contributes to a predictable trade
environment. On the other hand, transparency contributes to clear
decision-making processes and thereby to legitimacy in democratic
societies.88
The purpose of the transparency provisions is to provide a greater
degree of clarity, predictability and information about regulations; the
transparency achieved should facilitate the entry of WTO members into
the cross-border trade of goods and services based on predictable trade
regulations.89 Transparent regulation is a core requirement for attracting
investment and promoting economic growth; the WTO experiences
demonstrate that transparency helps to overcome uncertainties in busi-
ness processes and to improve the general basis for cooperation.90While
trade statistics published by theWTO contain important information for
market and policy-makers, its regulatory focus is – in contrast to ﬁnan-
cial organisations – not on quantitative indicators, but on transparent
procedures.
III. Preliminary assessment
The analysis of the transparency discussions in international fora during
the last ﬁve years has shown that this issue has played a key role and that
politicians, regulators and expert bodies, among others, were addressing
87 T. Cottier and M. Oesch, International Trade Regulation (Berne: Cameron May/
Staempﬂi, 2005), pp. 542–51 discuss transparency in the WTO as an element of the
rule of law.
88 Kaufmann and Weber, ‘The Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation’, p. 795;
M. Krajewski, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law’,
Journal of World Trade 35 (2001), 167–86, 169–70.
89 See Weber, Shaping Internet Governance, pp. 124–5. 90 See ibid., p. 125.
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many facets of transparency. In particular, the G-20 assigned a high
priority to looking at transparency from various angles.
However, apart from transparency regulations governing (private)
banks and other ﬁnancial institutions or intermediaries, the global com-
munity paid hardly any attention to transparency issues in the monetary
framework. Under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank Group,
efforts have now been made to improve the level of transparency related
to the monetary policies of the respective members, among others.
Nevertheless, the main achievement consists in the collection of general
data. However, as for the speciﬁc needs of transparency in monetary
affairs, there are still substantial analytical gaps. The following section
attempts to enrich the discussions in other areas for monetary affairs.
D. The three pillars of transparency in monetary affairs
I. Overview: conceptual framework and indicators
From a legal perspective, transparency can be analysed by applying a
three-dimensional concept, as indicated above. The three pillars are (i)
institutional procedures and decision-making, (ii) substantive founda-
tion and (iii) accountability. Applying this concept to empirical studies
requires a comprehensive set of indicators, which has been developed by
Eijfﬁnger and Geraats.91 They advocate ﬁfteen indicators for political,
economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency: the focus of
political transparency is on policy objectives; that of economic trans-
parency is on economic information, such as data, models and forecasts,
used for monetary policy; procedural transparency relates to the way
decisions are taken; policy transparency means prompt disclosure of
policy decisions, together with an explanation of the decision, and an
explicit policy inclination or indication of likely future policy actions;
operational transparency applies to the implementation of monetary
policy. It requires a discussion of the factors, including disturbances,
that affect the transmission of monetary policy.
In Table 18.1 we situate Eijfﬁnger’s and Geraats’ economic indicators
(1) to (15) in the legal framework by aligning each indicator with one of
the three pillars. In fact, Eijfﬁnger and Geraats deﬁne transparency of
monetary policy as the extent to which central banks disclose informa-
tion that is related to the policy-making process.92Consequently, most of
91 Supra note 33. 92 Eijfﬁnger and Geraats, ‘How Transparent are Central Banks?’, 3.
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the indicators, namely (4)–(6) and (8)–(15), reﬂect the different stages of
the decision-making process and only indicators (1)–(3) refer to the institu-
tional environment. With this focus it is possible to apply quantitative
indicators to measure some aspects of monetary transparency. Despite
this limited focus, the most recent study by Dincer and Eichengreen
shows a correlation between greater transparency of central bank opera-
tions with more stable political systems and a higher ranking with regard to
the rule of law.93 With these empirical ﬁndings in mind we will discuss the
three-pillar framework in the context of monetary affairs.94
II. The ﬁrst pillar: institutional framework and decision-making
1. Institutional framework
Legal certainty and predictability are essential for creating a stable
environment and are thus a prerequisite for efﬁcient monetary policies.95
What has been framed as ‘political transparency’ by economists,96
reﬂected in indicators (1)–(3) in Table 18.1, refers to key elements of
the rule of law: the applicable rules must be published, communicated
and made accessible to the addressees of the regulations.97 As simple as
this may sound in theory, in practice, its implementation can be chal-
lenging. Empirical studies show that institutional transparency ranks
high among the various dimensions of central bank transparency.98
Indicators for measuring institutional transparency are formal state-
ments of the objectives of monetary policy combined with a quantiﬁca-
tion of these objectives as well as explicit contracts or other institutional
arrangements between monetary authorities and the government.99
The institutional arrangements required for efﬁcient monetary policy-
making show some similarities with the transparency requirements
under WTO law with regard to publishing trade-related regulations
and restrictions. From an economic perspective, the rationale is the
same: enhancing efﬁciency and facilitating business activities. Market
93 Dincer and Eichengreen, ‘Central Bank Transparency’, 85.
94 For a recent general description of legal and economic elements of monetary affairs
(without aspects of transparency), see P. Nobel and H. Zimmermann, ‘Money, Legally
and Economically Speaking’, in P. Nobel and R. Benevenuto (eds.), Law and Economics
of Money and Currency (Zurich: Schulthess, 2012), p. 1 ff.
95 Kaufmann and Weber, ‘The Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation’, 784.
96 Dincer and Eichengreen, ‘Central Bank Transparency’, 81–3.
97 See also Kaufmann and Weber, ‘The Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation’, 784.
98 Dincer and Eichengreen, ‘Central Bank Transparency’, 82. 99 Ibid., 92; Table 18.1.
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Table 18.1. Monetary transparency: indicators and conceptual framework
Legal concept (Kaufmann and Weber 2010)
Economic
indicators
(Eijfﬁnger and
Geraats 2006)
Institutional procedures and
decision-making Substantive foundation Accountability
Political
transparency
(3) Are there explicit contracts or
other similar institutional
arrangements between the
monetary authorities and the
government?
(1) Is there a formal statement of
the objective(s) of monetary
policy, with an explicit
prioritisation in case of multiple
objectives?
(2) Is there a quantiﬁcation of the
primary objective(s)?
Economic
transparency
(4) Is the basic economic data relevant
for the conduct of monetary policy
publicly available?
(5) Does the central bank disclose
the formal macroeconomic
model(s) it uses for policy
analysis?
(6) Does the central bank regularly
publish its own macroeconomic
forecasts?
Procedural
transparency
(7) Does the central bank provide
an explicit policy rule or strategy
that describes its monetary policy
framework?
(8) Does the central bank give a
comprehensive account of policy
deliberations (or explanations in
case of a single central banker)
within a reasonable amount of
time?
(9) Does the central bank disclose
how each decision on the level of
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its main operating instrument or
target was reached?
Policy
transparency
(10) Are decisions about
adjustments to the main
operating instrument or target
announced promptly?
(11) Does the central bank provide
an explanation when it
announces policy decisions?
(12) Does the central bank disclose
an explicit policy inclination after
every policy meeting, or an
explicit indication of likely future
policy actions (at least quarterly)?
Operational
transparency
(13) Does the central bank regularly
evaluate to what extent its main
operating targets (if any) have
been achieved?
(14) Does the central bank regularly
provide information on
(unanticipated) macroeconomic
disturbances that affect the policy
transmission process?
(15) Does the central bank regularly
provide an evaluation of the
policy outcome in light of its
macroeconomic objectives?
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participants need to know the applicable rules. From a legal perspective,
transparency of the institutional framework follows from the rule of law.
A further important element related to the institutional pillar is the
independence of monetary institutions from governmental inﬂu-
ence.100 This independence is closely related to the above-mentioned
need to learn about the economic environment and the discretion to
deviate from announced policies based on new knowledge, if necessary.
Nevertheless, the delegation of policy decisions and reactions to a
changing environment to independent central banks or to other mon-
etary institutions, requires democratic safeguards. These institutions
need to be vested with the necessary legitimacy both politically and
democratically. In this regard, communicating experiences and knowl-
edge, as well as lack of knowledge, to society and thus making policy
changes and the underlying ‘learning process’ transparent, is essen-
tial.101 Such transparency requirements do not preclude measures such
as market interventions which cannot be communicated in advance
if they are to remain effective. What transparency requires in such
circumstances is a timely ex post communication about the assessment
of the situation by the central bank that led to the measures being taken
as well as an evaluation of (the ‘lessons learnt’ from) the achieved
results.
2. Procedural transparency
Related to the institutional framework is procedural transparency in
terms of a clear allocation of tasks and responsibilities to authorities
and the market participants, respectively. Members of society must be
able to establish who is doing what under which circumstances and who
can be approached and reproached.102 Uncertainty with respect to
responsibilities and procedures should be avoided. This criterion is
(partially) reﬂected in indicator (3) in Table 18.1.
An example of non-transparent policy goals and uncoordinated
standards occurred in Switzerland in summer 2012: notwithstanding
the fact that Credit Suisse is permanently supervised by FINMA, the
100 K. Hielscher and G. Markwardt, ‘The Role of Political Institutions for the Effectiveness
of Central Bank Independence’, European Journal of Political Economy 28 (2012),
286–301.
101 King, ‘The Institutions of Monetary Policy’, 5–6 and 12: ‘A central bank needs to
explain to the population both what it knows and what it does not know.’
102 See also the similar question raised by Kaufmann and Weber, ‘The Role of
Transparency in Financial Regulation’, 785.
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Swiss ﬁnancial market supervisory authority, the Swiss National Bank
(SNB), published a statement (without having properly pre-informed
Credit Suisse) that in its view Credit Suisse was substantially undercapital-
ised. While it was undisputed that Credit Suisse, as well as other banks,
needed to increase its capital base, FINMA as the competent supervisor had
granted an implementation period until 2019.103 Not surprisingly, the
SNB’s statement triggered market turbulence. Obviously, contradictory
statements of FINMA and the SNB created uncertainties in the market
and thereby jeopardised transparency of the current analysis of facts by
different public agencies.
III. The second pillar: substantive foundation
The Atlantic Charter signed by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill in August 1941, and the subsequent negotiations at the
Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, emphasised what is broadly
accepted today: transparency is not a goal in itself but rather a
means to an end. In fact, the negotiators at Bretton Woods agreed
that stable monetary and ﬁnancial systems were a key condition for
a peaceful postwar order.104 Transparency was seen as a catalyst for
re-establishing trust in stable currencies after the turmoil of the
1930s.105 The means of achieving the desired objectives was the estab-
lishment of the IMF and the World Bank and a ﬁxed exchange rates
regime tied to gold.
Still, the important criterion is not the quantity of information but its
quality. As pointed out above in Section C, many institutions have
become involved in standard-setting and regulation in the aftermath of
the ﬁnancial crisis. In increasingly interconnected ﬁnancial markets,
proposals for regulation and the responses by different stakeholders
tend to multiply among the different fora and at the national and
international level.106
It seems that in the global quest for transparency, the need for good-
quality information rather than information overload has been partially
neglected, not only as far as the regulation of ﬁnancial markets in general
103 FINMA Newsletter 38 (2012), 20 July 2012, Eigenmittelnachweis – Basel III (German
only), www.ﬁnma.ch/e/ﬁnma/publikationen/Pages/ﬁnmamitteilungen.aspx.
104 See Weber and Arner, ‘Toward a New Design’, 393 ff.
105 See Kaufmann and Weber, ‘The Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation’, 787.
106 Bradley, ‘Transparency is the New Opacity’, 28.
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is concerned,107 but also in monetary affairs.108 In fact, information
overload may make it impossible to adequately process, digest and use
the information109 and can lead to the so-called ‘Cassandra effect’110 or
to ignoring ‘the prospect of future changes about the actual character of
which we know nothing’.111
In essence, the impact of transparency measures on public policy
depends on their structure and on the balance between the ‘value of
sunlight’ and ‘over-exposure’. The latter may result in information over-
load, excessive politicisation or dysfunctional surveillance.112 In addi-
tion, consumers may be overwhelmed with information which may
hamper their ability to make informed good decisions.113 As Caroline
Bradley noted, complex transactions lead to complex rules and standards
and this complexity impedes transparency. At the same time, efforts to
make transnational standard-setting processes more transparent risk
making the information overload problem worse rather than better.114
Generally speaking, any policies for enhancing transparency require
not only a solid conceptual basis but also a substantial relation to the
purpose for which the information is sought, to the capacity of and the
incentives for actors to provide the information.115 If different organ-
isations and supervisory bodies for ﬁnancial markets succeed in clarify-
ing the content of tasks as well as the regulatory responsibility and
transparency, the conﬁdence of market participants will increase.116
Moreover, apart from their substantial value, clearly deﬁned mandates
107 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 30 July 2002, 116 Stat. 745, 15 USC § 7201 is a good example
of an extremely detailed (and complicated) ‘rule book’ which, however, does not allow
the addressees of the rules to gain easy ‘access’ to the basic underlying message of the
detailed regulations.
108 Bradley, ‘Transparency is the New Opacity’, 28–32.
109 D. Heald, ‘Varieties of Transparency’, Proceedings of the British Academy 135 (2006),
25–43, 35.
110 For further details, see R. H. Weber, ‘Kassandra oder Wissensbroker – Dilemma im
Global Village’, in J. Becker, R.M. Hilty, J.-F. Stöckli and T. Würtenberger (eds.), Recht
im Wandel seines sozialen und technologischen Umfelds, Festschrift für Manfred
Rehbinder (Bern: Stämpﬂi, 2002), pp. 405–21, 407.
111 J. M. Keynes, ‘The General Theory of Employment’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 51
(1937), 209–23, 214.
112 Heald, ‘Why is Transparency About Public Expenditure So Elusive?’, 32.
113 Bradley, ‘Transparency is the New Opacity’, 28. 114 Ibid., 31.
115 See Kaufmann and Weber, ‘The Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation’, 790;
R. B. Mitchell, ‘Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International
Regimes’, International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998), 109–30, 109–10.
116 See Kaufmann and Weber, ‘The Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation’, 790.
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and tasks are important elements of accountability which, as indicated
in Table 18.1,117 is a key criterion in shaping efﬁcient monetary policies.
IV. The third pillar: accountability
Accountability is a concept with many facets:118 together with checks
and balances it is a prerequisite for legitimacy and a key element of any
governance discussion. Obviously, accountability depends on reliable
information.119
Accountability must be assessed with regard to the manifold relation-
ships in the ﬁnancial sector, in particular between the state and the
ﬁnancial institutions, between supervisory authorities and market par-
ticipants and between different (quasi-)governmental organisations.120
These relationships should be based on a transparent data regime: ex
ante mechanisms help to prevent the abuse of power, ex post account-
ability applies instruments such as a judicial review or non-traditional
remedies to assess monetary activities.121 Indicators (2)–(6) in Table 18.1
focus on measures to make information on the policy framework acces-
sible and are therefore related to ex ante accountability, while indicators
(8)–(15) focus on ex post assessments.
In addition, a distinction needs to be made between a retrospective
reporting cycle and real-time surveillance. The key difference between
the two lies in the length of the accountability window. In a real-time
setting, the accountability window is always open and surveillance is an
ongoing process. Examples of this type of system are macroeconomic
forecasts, including changes. In a retrospective system, the accountability
window will be interrupted by the reporting lag during which the
institution is preparing the information for the public.122 Retrospective
transparency may prevent political pressure on central bank board
members when it comes to disclosing the minutes of board meetings.
117 Above Section D.I; Dincer and Eichengreen, ‘Central Bank Transparency’, 88.
118 R.M. Lastra and H. Shams, ‘Public Accountability in the Financial Sector’ in E. Ferran
and C. Goodhart (eds.), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 21st Century
(Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 165–88, 166–9; Weber, Shaping Internet
Governance, p. 133.
119 Kaufmann and Weber, ‘The Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation’, 791.
120 See also ibid., 791.
121 R.W. Grant and R. O. Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics’, American Political Science Review 99 (2005), 29–43, 30–1; slightly different,
Lastra and Shams, ‘Public Accountability’, p. 169.
122 Heald, ‘Why is Transparency About Public Expenditure So Elusive?’, 32–4.
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An example of a retrospective system is the proceedings of the Federal
Open Markets Committee of the Federal Reserve, which are released
with a delay of one month.123 In contrast, the European Central Bank
has, since its establishment, justiﬁed its refusal to publish the minutes
and voting records of its council on the grounds that individual members
would then be subject to pressure from special interest groups (national
interests, in this context) that might compromise their independence
and lead to inefﬁcient policy decisions. Recently, this policy has become
controversial with at least two members of the ECB’s Governing Council
advocating increased transparency, by, inter alia, releasing the minutes
of the meetings.124 A possible middle-way could be to publish voting
patterns instead of individual council member statements, which may
foster predictability while still protecting independence.125
Clearly, in a monetary context, reliable quantitative indicators for
communicating and evaluating monetary objectives, such as inﬂation
targets, are essential for establishing credible accountability mechanisms.
Recent empirical studies suggest a positive correlation between transpar-
ent accountability mechanisms as captured by indicators (8)–(15) in
Table 18.1 and lower inﬂation rates.126
E. Conclusions
This chapter shows that the present lack of a comprehensive analytical
framework for transparency in monetary affairs can at least partially be
compensated by adapting existing instruments available in other areas of
law. We suggest complementing the general three-pillar framework –
institutional and/or procedural elements, substantive foundation and
accountability – with criteria that are empirically proven to enhance
efﬁciency of monetary policy. Examples include the ﬁfteen indicators
developed by Eijfﬁnger and Geraats127 which are highly relevant for our
framework as shown in Table 18.1.
123 Federal Open Market Committee – Statements of Policy, Policy Regarding the
Government in the Sunshine Act, 12 CFR 281; as amended effective 16 February 2005.
124
‘Making the European Central Bank more Transparent’, Financial Times, 19 September
2012; ‘Wie viel Transparenz verträgt die EZB?’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 September
2012, 25.
125 P.M. Geraats, ‘ECB Credibility and Transparency’, European Economy, Economic
Papers 3330 (European Commission, June 2008), p. 25.
126 Dincer and Eichengreen, ‘Central Bank Transparency’, 90.
127 Eijfﬁnger and Geraats, ‘How Transparent are Central Banks?’.
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As for procedural transparency, lessons can be drawn fromWTO law,
in particular the GATS, with its strong emphasis on the rule of law. This
approach is supported by empirical ﬁndings according to which a
stronger adherence to the rule of law is correlated to higher transpar-
ency. Moreover, transparency is particularly relevant for the publication
of monetary policy and related instruments as reﬂected in indicators
(1), (3)–(6), (8)–(9) and (13)–(15) in Table 18.1.
Since transparency in monetary affairs requires quantitative, measur-
able criteria, transparency indicators, such as those established by the
IMF, should be included and elaborated further to meet the speciﬁc
needs of monetary policy.
Finally, we conclude that, in monetary affairs, striking a balance
between transparency and other policy goals is necessary. Recent debates
illustrate that enhanced transparency may lead to increased political
pressure and thus jeopardise central bank independence. In our view,
the parameters for such a balancing test should be deﬁned in a demo-
cratically legitimised process.
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